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THE SYSTEM OF OWN RESOURCES 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This  report  reviewing  the  operation  of  the  Community's  system  of  own 
resources  and  suggesting  improvements  is  submitted  in  accordance  with 
Article 10  of the 1988 Own Resources Decision. 
Since  1980, when it represented  approximately 0.  7% of Community GNP,  the 
size  of  the  Community  budget  relative  to  GNP  has  expanded  substantially, 
although  it has  risen  only slightly since  1988, from  1 .08%  in  1988 to  1 .15% 
of  Community  GNP  in  1992  due  mainly  to  slower  growth  in  spending  on 
agriculture in  recent years. 
As  to  the  structure  of  the  various  own  resources  in  total  receipts,  the 
share  of traditional  own  resources  has  declined  as  the  budget  has  expanded, 
from  about  one  half  to  under  one  third  of  total  resources,  although  their 
size  has  fallen  only  slightly  as  a  percentage  of  Community  GNP. 
Correspondingly,  the  share  of  the  resources  based  on  the  economic 
aggregates VAT and  GNP  has  grown from around half of the total financing to 
over two-thirds. 
From 1988 to 1990, total spending was lower than had been expected in 1988, 
due  mainly  to  the  smaller-than-expected  EAGGF  spending,  although  in  1991 
and  1992,  the  budget  was  slightly  larger  than  forecast  in  1988.  In 
addition  to  this,  average  economic  growth  to  1992  has  been  faster  than 
projected  in  1988,  resulting  in  a  larger  VAT  base.  The  overall  consequence 
has  therefore  been  that,  up  to  1992,  recourse  to  the  fourth  (GNP)  resource 
was much less than was forecast in  1988. 
Looking  at  the  question  of  burden-sharing,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  distribution  by  country  of  budgetary  receipts  and  expenditures  gives 
only  a  very  partial  picture  of  the  true  costs  and  benefits  of  Community 
membership. 
With  this  caveat  in  mind,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  present  distribution 
by  country  of  total  own  resources  is  out  of  line  with  GNP  weights,  even 
excluding  traditional  own  resources  and  the  UK  abatement.  The  less 
prosperous Member States tend to pay more than their share in GNP,  as  do D, 
F  and  the  UK,  due to  their  high  VAT bases.  The  small  shares  of B,  OK  and  I 
are due to their relatively small  payments of the VAT-based  resource. 
The  VAT  resource,  excluding  the  effect  of  the  UK  abatement,  is  generally 
regressive,  making  the  resource  out  of  line  with  the  contributive  capacity 
of Member  States,  with  the  poorer  Member  States  tending  to  pay  more  than 
their GNP share,  even after the corrective effect of capping. - 5  -
The  budgetary  reform  of 1988 did  have  redistributive  elements  coming  from 
the  doubling  of  the  structural  Funds  (which,  although  redistributive  in 
aim,  are  basically  allocative  in  function),  the  introduction  of  the  GNP 
resource and VAT capping,  and  the continuation of the UK abatement with the 
reduction  in  its  financing  by  Germany.  Nevertheless  the  full  redistributive 
impact of  the  1988  reforms  are  only  now feeding  through.  Especially  since 
the  GNP  resource  still  only  makes  up  just over  20%  of own  resources,  and 
the structural Funds have not yet reached their doubled level. 
For the future, the dynamic development of the Community budget is expected 
to  continue.  The  further  progress  in  the  economic  and  political  context  of 
the  Community  will,  even  with  the  full  application  of  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity,  cause  the  size  of  the  budget  to  increase  as  responsibilities 
in  the  areas  of  allocation,  cohesion,  stabilization  and  foreign  policy  are 
assigned to the Community level. 
In  addition,  the  structure  of  own  resources  is  also  likely  to  change 
substantially  in  future  years  with  the  traditional  own  resources  destined 
to  decline  further  in  importance  as  the  effects  of  the  GATT  round  and  the 
CAP reform are felt. 
The  advent  of  EMU  and  the  realization  of  Political  Union  will  further 
increase  the  need  for  fairness  in  the  budget.  Thus  a  priority  for  the 
changes  which  could  be  made  to the system of own  resources  should  be  to 
address  the  issue  of  fairness  between  Member  States.  As  set  out  in  the 
Maastricht Protocol  on Social  and  Economic  Cohesion,  greater account should 
be  taken  of  the  contributive  capacity  of  individual  Member  States,  and  the 
regressive  elements  existing  in  the  present  own  resources  system  should  be 
corrected. 
The  contributive  capacity  of  Member  States  could  be  better  taken  into 
account  by  increasing  the  use  of  the  GNP  resource  through  a  reduction  in 
the  VAT  call  rate  of 0.4 percentage  points.  This  would  take  the  VAT ceiling 
down  to  1%  from  the  present  1.4%.  Also,  the  regressive  distortion  of the 
VAT  resource  could  be  mitigated  by  introducing  a  lower  level  of capping  of 
the VAT base at 50% of GNP compared to the present 55%. Both these measures 
would  reduce  the  financial  burden  on  the  less  prosperous  Member  States  by 
shifting  it  towards  B,  OK  and  I,  whose  GNP  share  substantially  exceeds 
their  VAT  share.  These  countries  would  nevertheless  still  retain  a 
significant  advantage  in  the  own  resource  system.  In  addition,  these 
changes  would  reduce significantly the size  of the UK abatement. - 6 -
For  the  institutional  and  the  financial  development  of  the  Community,  it 
would  be  desirable  to  introduce  a  new  fifth  own  resource.  It  is  important 
that  a  new  own  resource  should  be  fair.  Also  it  should  be  a  genuine 
Community tax and thus come from a harmonized base. This harmonization must 
be  justified  on  economic  grounds.  Moreover,  politically,  a  fifth  resource 
should  be  linked  to  increased  budgetary  responsibilities  for  the  European 
Parliament. 
The  Commission  has  examined  various  possibilities  concerning  taxes  at  the 
national level  whose proceeds could  be  shared  with the Community. However, 
it  has  found  that,  at  present,  no  candidate  exists  in  the  tax  system  of the 
Member States with a base  that is  sufficiently harmonized. 
In  the  medium-term,  the  political  development of the  Community will  make  a 
new  own  resource  necessary.  The  Commission  will  make  every  effort  to 
promote the necessary conditions allowing the creation of such a resource. - 7 -
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This  report  is  submitted  in  accordance  with  Article  1  0  of  the  Council 
Decision of 24 June 1988 on the system of the  Communities'  own resources 
(88/376/EEC,  Euratom)  which  stipulates  that  "the  Commission  shall  submit, 
by  the  end  of  1991,  a  report  on  the  operation  of  the  system,  including  a 
re-examination  of  the  correction  of  budgetary  imbalances  granted  to  the 
United Kingdom". 
The  re-examination  of  the  correction  of  the  Uk's  budgetary  imbalance  will 
be  presented at a later date. 
The  report  also  deals  with  the  matter  raised  in  the  Commission's 
declaration  in  the  Council  minutes  of  20  June  1988  that  it  will  "examine, 
in  the  light  of  the  functioning  of  the  1988  system  of  own  resources,  the 
case  for  presenting  a  proposal  to  put  into  effect  the  provisions  of  Article 
2.2 of the  (abovementioned)  Decision  on  Own Resources",  i.e.  a  proposal  for 
a  new Community own  resource  to  be  presented  to  the  Council  for  adoption 
according  to the  procedure of Article  201  (Council  document 7161/88-Annex 
of 20 June  1988). 
The  Report  should  also  be  seen  in  the  light of the Protocol  on  Economic and 
Social  Cohesion  agreed  at  the  Maastricht  European  Council  in  which  the 
Commission  and  the  Member  States  declared  their  intention  to  take  greater 
account  of  the  contributive  capacity  of  individual  Member  States  in  the 
system  of  own  resources  and  to  examine  means  of  correcting  for  the  less 
prosperous  Member  States  regressive  elements  existing  in  the  present  own 
resources system. (2) 
-------------------------------------- -----··-------·-----· 
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II.  THE WORKING OF THE  PRESENT  SYSTEM OF OWN RESOURCES 
1 .  The  development of own  resources  and  their structure over the  period 
1980-1992 
1 .1  The size of the budget. 
As  a  result  of increased  Community expenditure,  the  size  of the 
Community budget rose from approximately 0.  70% of Community GNP 
in  1980 to  1.08% in  1988, but  has  risen  only  slightly  since  then 
to reach an expected  1.15% in  1992 (see  Graph  1 ). 
However,  the  various  own  resources  increased  at  rates  different 
from  the  global  size  of  the  budget  implying  a  change  in  their 
structure.  Thus  whereas  the  traditional  own  resources  amounted 
to almost 0.4% of Community GNP  in  1980, covering  one  half of 
the  financial  requirements,  their  relative  size  had  fallen  to 
0.3% of GNP  in  1988, remaining stable up to 1992, providing now 
less  than  one  quarter  of  the  Community  budget's  financial 
requirements. The resources based upon economic aggregates (VAT 
and  GNP  resources)  made  up the remainder with the VAT resource 
still  by  far  the  largest  own  resource,  providing  around  55%  of 
receipts  in  1992,  against  over  20%  for  the  GNP  resource  (see 
Chart 1  ). 
1.2  Traditional own resources 
The  traditional  own  resources  (less  than  25  %  of total  resource' 
in  1991)  consist  of  agricultural  levies  (some  2%  of  tot; 
resources).  sugar  contributions  (also  approximately  2%)  ar 
customs duties (almost 20% of total resources). 
Sugar  contributions  are  related  to  the  financially  , elf-
sustaining  sugar  scheme  and  make  up  a  fairly  constant  share  of 
own  resources.  Their  level  is  actually  geared  to  the  financial 
requirements  of  that  scheme  due  to  storage  costs  and  export 
restitutions. 
The  other  traditional  own  resources  have  been  exposed  to 
statutory, structural and  cyclical developments. ]: 
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Agricultural  levies  reflect  decisions  taken  within  the  framework 
of the  CAP.  As  the  period  has  seen  a  growing  self-sufficiency  of 
agricultural  products,  imports  into  the  Community  have  declined 
and  EC  world  market  shares  of  agricultural  imports  have 
diminished.  Concessions  granted  to  various  third  countries  have, 
furthermore,  reduced  annual  receipts  from  this  resource 
considerably.  Variations  in  world  market  prices  and  currency 
changes  have  finally  influenced  the  contribution  from 
agricultural levies  over the period. 
Customs  duties  have  been  subject to  similar  influences.  Over the 
years,  the  various  bilateral  and  multilateral  trade  negotiations 
have  reduced  the  weighted  average  tariff  rate  to  the  present 
5.19%  in  1989  (latest  figures  available).  However,  as  a  result 
of  unilateral  or  mutual  concessions,  the  actual  incidence  in 
1989 was  2.84%,  a  figure  which  varies  from  one  year to  another 
as  a  result  of  a  changing  import  structure  in  value  terms  (e.g. 
higher  prices  of  oil,  subject  to  low  tariffs,  will  reduce  the 
overall  incidence).  Second,  Community  imports  from  third 
countries have fallen as  a  share of Community GOP  from 12.6% in 
1980 to 9.5% in  1991. Thus imports, which amounted to 23.6% of 
world  trade  in  1980,  dropped  to  21 .9%  in  1990 (excluding  intra-
Community  trade).  Finally,  developments  in  world  market  prices, 
exchange  rates  and  import  propensities  have  influenced  the 
overall outcome. 
1 .3  VAT and  GNP  resources. 
The resources based upon economic aggregates (i.e.  VAT and GNP) 
make  up  the  balance  (disregarding  various  minor  receipts).  They 
are  expected  to  account  for  about  75%  of  the  total  budgetary 
resources required  in  1992, against only 50% in  1980. 
The  VAT  base  increased  at  a  slightly  faster  rate  (7.5%)  than 
Community GNP (7 .0%) from 1980  to 1988, when the new Decision on 
Own Resources capped the VAT base for individual Member States 
at 55% of their GNP.  The VAT capping method was chosen in 1988 
as  a  compromise  following  a  Commission  proposal  to  relate  a 
fourth  resource  to  the  difference  between  the  VAT and  the  GNP-
base in  order to compensate for wide discrepancies among Member 
States  between  the  two  aggregates.  It  was  finally  decided  to 
use  only  GNP  as  a  base  for  the  fourth  resource  and  to  put  a 
fixed  ceiling  on  the  size  of the  VAT  base.  (See  Tables 1  and  2 
for  the  evolution  of  the  uncapped  and  capped  VAT  bases  as  a 
percentage of GNP.) - 12 -
In  1992,  through  being  capped,  six  Member  States  will  have 
effectively  switched  their  VAT  base  to  the  GNP  aggregate 
(Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  Portugal  and  the  United 
Kingdom).  However,  the  proportion  of VAT  receipts  made  up  of 
the  contribution  of  the  capped  Member  States  will  still  be 
higher  than  their  GNP  share  because  of  the  lower  contributions 
of  the  non-capped  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  rate  of  increase 
of  the  Community  VAT  base  will  consequently  become  closer  to 
that of the Community GNP. 
The  uniform  call  rate  applied  to  the  VAT  base  in  order  to 
calculate  budgetary  contributions,  gradually  rose  from 
approximately  0. 7%  in  1980  to  1.0%  in  1984  and  again  to  a 
maximum of 1.4% from 1986 onwards. The actual VAT rates differ 
between  Member  States  because  of  the  financing  of  the  United 
Kingdom abatement and  its impact upon VAT payments from other 
Member States. 
Until  1988,  further  budgetary  requirements  were  covered  by 
supplementary  contributions  adopted  on  an  ad  hoc-basis.  Since 
then  a  fourth  resource,  introduced  by  the  1988  decision,  has 
been  calculated  according  to  the  Member  States'  GNP  and  serves 
as  a  budgetary  buffer,  which  represents  the  main  novelty  of the 
1988  revised  system.  In  1990 the  previous  year's  balance  wiped 
out almost any need for the new GNP-based resource.  However, in 
1991  the  fourth  resource  financed  15.5%  of  the  budget, 
corresponding to 0.16% of GNP,  and  in  1992 will  reach  over 20% 
of the budget. VAT  Bases  (uncapped)  as  a percentage  of  GtW  :  1984-1992 
Member  1984  1985  1986 
States  (  1)  (  1)  (  1) 
B  49.73  49.57  47.51 
OK  46.26  46.58  46.87 
D  52.58  50.67  48.45 
GR 
E  45.72 
F  51.63  52.02  51.40 
IR  63.20  64.05  62.45 
I  (  3)  41.38  40.55  41.35 
L  61.67  62.81  63.86 
NL  48.26  49.19  50.99 
p (4) 
UK  58.80  60.72  59.49 
EUR12  46.79  46.67  48.69 
(1)  Actual  bases,  latest revision  31/07/91 
(2)  Budgetary  bases 
1987 
(  1) 
47.88 
45.07 
49.31 
50.45 
52.63 
52.58 
60.06 
41.17 
64.75 
50.76 
59.07 
50.09 
(3)  Revised  estimates  for  1988,1989,1990  and  1992 
(4)  Excluding  Hadeire  and  A~ores 
Table  I 
(%) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
(  1)  (  1)  (  1)  (2)  (2) 
47.86  46.47  45.71  46.58  45.85 
42.02  41.39  41.29  42.76  41.23 
48.69  48.36  49.37  48.58  52.56 
57.46  61.54  64.19  56.45  59.88 
55.18  57.20  51.40  52.26  56.07 
52.01  51.54  51.18  52.65  52.43 
65.71  62.47  60.42  67.23  64.42 
43.26  41.29  41.83  40.64  40.94 
67.48  60.64  60.10  65.93  64.36 
50.86  50.96  51.47  50.26  50.89 
78.52  75.91  67.57  74.55 
60.67  58.98  55.40  60.79  57.89  lN 
50.41  50.64  50.00  50.49  51.51 VAT  Bases  (capped)  as  a percentage  of  GtW  : 1984-1992 
Member  1984  1985  1986 
States  (  1)  (1)  (  1) 
B  49.73  49.57  47.51 
DK  46.26  46.58  46.87 
D  52.58  50.67  48.45 
GR 
E  45.72 
F  51.63  52.02  51.40 
IR  63.20  64.05  62.45 
I  (3)  41.38  40.55  41.35 
L  61.67  62.81  63.86 
NL  48.26  49.19  50.99 
p (4) 
UK  58.80  60.72  59.49 
EUR12  46.79  46.67  48.69 
(1)  Actual  bases,  latest revision  31/07/91 
(2)  Budgetary  bases 
1987 
(  1) 
47.88 
45.07 
49.31 
50.45 
52.63 
52.58 
60.06 
41.17 
64.75 
50.76 
59.07 
50.09 
(3)  Revised  estimates  for  1988,1989,1990  and  1992 
(4)  Excluding  HaL~ire and  A90res 
Table  II 
(%) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
(  1)  (1)  (1)  (2)  (2) 
47.86  46.47  45.71  46.58  45.85 
42.02  41.39  41.29  42.76  41.23 
48.69  48.36  49.37  48.58  52.56 
55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00 
55.00  55.00  51.40  52.26  55.00 
52.01  51.54  51.18  52.65  52.43 
55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00 
43.26  41.29  41.83  40.64  40.94 
55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00 
50.86  50.96  51.47  50.26  50.89 
55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00 
~ 
.t-
55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00  55.00 
49.90  49.45  49.55  49.33  50.61 - 1  5 -
2.  The Development of own resources compared to the 1988 forecasts. 
The comparison  between actual  outturns and  the  projected  evolution of 
own  resources  as  envisaged  at  the  time  of  adoption  of  the  Own 
Resources  Decision  in  1988,  shows  a  slower-than-expected  increase  in 
expenditure  up  to  1990 and  a  larger  rise  in  the  underlying  VAT  and 
GNP  base.  By  1992,  however,  the  level  of  expenditure  has  reached 
what was forecast in  1988 (see Chart 2). 
Thus, total expenditure in 1990 corresponding to 1 .0% of GNP, was 10% 
(or  5.3bn ecus)  lower  than  foreseen  (1.1%  of  GNP),  basically  due  to 
smaller EAGGF payments.  Taking into account budgetary transfers from 
1989, the  total  own  resources  required  to  finance  the  budget  in  1990 
were more than 12% (or 9.5bn ecus)  below the outcome expected in 1988 
(or  0.9% of GNP  against  1.1 %).  At the  same  time,  stronger economic 
growth boosted the VAT base in  1990 to a level some 5% above the size 
then  envisaged,  adding  supplementary  finance  (or  1.6bn ecus)  to  the 
budget.  As  a  result  the  fourth  GNP  resource,  introduced  as  part  of 
the new Decision, was' not used at all  in  1990. 
For  the  years  1991  and  1992,  however,  total  expenditure  will  rise 
once  more,  exceeding  1988  expectations,  with  EAGGF  spending 
increasing  again.  Nevertheless,  recourse  to  the  fourth  (GNP) 
resource  will  remain  less  than  expected  in  1988 due  to  the  expanded 
VAT base caused  by the strong economic growth since 1988. 120-
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The  analysis  above  shows  that  the  discrepancy  between  the  actual 
outcome  and  the  development expected  in  1988 has  been  a  result of 
cyclical  effects  both  on  the  expenditure  side  and  on  the  receipts 
side.  In  contrast  to  other  Community  expenditure,  the  EAGGF 
guarantee  spending  depends  on  world  agricultural  price  developments, 
Community  output  and  agricultural  exports.  Since  EAGGF  guarantee 
payments  make  up  more  than  half  of  total  Community  budgetary 
expenditure,  any  modification  of  the  underlying  parameters  will  lead 
to considerable changes in  overall spending. 
In  a  similar  way,  the  development  of  own  resources  reflects  the 
economic  environment.  A  rise  in  economic  activity  will  thus  reduce 
the  need  to  call  upon  the  fourth  (GNP)  resource  by  increasing  the 
size  of  the  VAT  base  and  hence  total  VAT  receipts  (and  vice-versa). 
It  will  as  a  consequence  also  both  modify  the  structure  of  budgetary 
receipts  and  the  relative  contributions  of  Member  States,  depending 
upon their individual shares of the different resources. 
3.  Burden-sharing 
3.1  Present situation 
This  section  looks  at  the  fairness  of  the  present  system  of  own 
resources. 
The  distribution  by  country  of  origin  of  the  Community's  total 
own  resources,  excluding  traditional  own  resources  and  the 
effect of the  UK  abatement,  is  presented  in  Chart  3.  It compares 
the  share  of  resources  coming  from  each  country  with  the  share 
of  GNP  of  each  country,  representing  the  contributive  capacity 
of  the  Member  States.  It  shows  that  the  receipts  from  each 
Member  State  are  out  of  line  with  the  GNP  key.  This  is 
especially true  for  GR,  E,  IRL,  P and  UK  which  have  capped  VAT 
bases.  Conversely,  B,  OK  and  I  pay  relatively  little  of  the  VAT 
based  resource. 
Chart  4  presents  the  distribution  of  total  receipts  from  each 
Member  State  including  traditional  own  resources  and  the  UK 
abatement.  It shows how the  abatement aids the UK,  though  it is 
designed  to  correct  a  problem  which  is  largely  on  the 
expenditure  side.  It  also  shows  the  impact  of  the  large 
traditional own resource  shares of B and NL explained  below. CHART  3 
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An  analysis  by  individual  own  resource  is  presented  in  the 
following sections. 
3.1.1  Traditional Own Resources 
Traditional  own  resources  are  largely  receipts  from  tariffs  on 
imported  goods  and  similar  duties  on  imported  agricultural 
products.  They  are  collected  for  the  Community  at  the  port  of 
entry by each Member State. 
In  order  to  look  at  the  distribution  by  country  of  the  own 
resource  system,  it  is  necessary  to  estimate  the  resources 
coming  from  each  country.  While  this  is  fairly  clear  for  the 
VAT- and  GNP-based  resources,  it  raises  considerable  theoretical 
problems  for  the  traditional  own  resources,  because  the  act  of 
collection  in  (and  hence  actual  payment to the Community  budget 
by)  one  particular  country  does  not  mean  that  the  economic 
burden  of  that  resource  has  been  effectively  carried  in  that 
country.  This would not be  the case without the EC. 
This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  first  place  from  the  impact 
of  the  'Rotterdam  Effect'.  Here,  due  to  the  effects  of  intra-
Community  trade,  during  which  goods  are  often  imported  from 
third  countries  and  then  re-exported  to  another  Community 
country,  the  collection  of the  Community  resource  {the  customs 
duty)  may  well  take  place  in  one  country  with  the  economic 
burden being carried in  another country. - 21  -
It  can  also  be  argued  that  there  are  methodological  problems 
linked  to  the  fact  that  some  countries  traditionally  import  a 
larger  share  of  GNP  than  others  and  thus  transfer  a  relatively 
larger  share  of  traditional  own  resources  to  the  Community 
budget.  However,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the 
economic  burden  is  being  disproportionately  borne  by · such 
countries.  In  a  unified  market,  an  import  tariff  will  cause 
prices  for  that  good  to  rise  throughout  the  market,  even  though 
perhaps  only  a  relatively  small  amount  of  imports  in  one 
particular  area  is  observed.  Thus,  the  economic  costs,  as  well 
as  the  perceived  economic  benefit  in  terms  of  employment 
creation may be  spread throughout the market. 
These  methodological  problems  cast  considerable  doubt  on  the 
validity  of  the  method  of  using  budgetary  receipts  to  measure 
the  distribution  of  the  burden  by  country  of  the  traditional  own 
resources.  Thus,  the  figures  presented  below  are  probably 
misleading  and  should  be  treated  therefore  with  the  appropriate 
caution. 
Chart  5  presents  the  distribution  of  traditional  own  resources 
by  Member State  according  to  budgetary  receipts.  The  Rotterdam 
Effect  may  well  explain  the  fact  that  the  Netherlands,  Ireland 
and  Belgium  pay  over  twice  of  their  proportional  share  (relative 
to  GNP)  of  traditional  own  resources  (8  and  NL  due  to  their 
ports,  IRL  due  to  its  intensive  use  of  intermediate  goods). 
Portugal  is  also  the  source  of  a  relatively  large  amount  of 
traditional  own  resources,  largely  due  to  high  levels  of  cereals 
imports.  Similarily,  the  UK  is  a  large  importer,  especially  of 
food  products,  and  thus  is  the  source  of  a  relatively  large 
proportion of traditional own resources. in  ~~ 
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3.1.2 VAT Resource 
The VAT-based own resource  is  collected  from the Member States 
based  on  a  notional,  harmonized  VAT base.  It is  not,  as  would  be 
theoretically  possible,  collected  as  a  share  in  the  VAT 
effectively paid  on each purchase. 
The  VAT  base  is  capped  at  55% of GNP.  The  effect of capping 
makes the VAT resource  base evolve similarly to the GNP  resource 
for  the  countries  that  are  capped  (in  1992  F,  GR,  IRL,  L,  P, 
UK),  although  the  capped  VAT  key  still  leaves  an  advantage  to 
those countries with a low VAT base as  a percentage of GNP. 
Chart 6  shows the distribution  of the capped  VAT base compared 
to GNP.  These are not in  line because VAT bases,  both capped and 
uncapped, differ widely between countries as  a  percentage of GNP 
(see  Tables  1  and  2  above).  The  less  prosperous  countries  (GR, 
E,  IRL,  P)  all  have  relatively  high  VAT  bases  and  are  therefore 
disadvantaged.  Other  countries  (1,  DK  and  B  in  particular)  pay 
relatively  little  VAT-based  resource  contributions  compared  to 
their GNP. 
The  main  reasons  for  this  appear  to  be  differences  in  the  share 
of consumption  and  savings  in  GNP.  Countries with high  levels of 
consumption  or low levels  of saving  as  a  proportion  of GOP  tend 
to  have  high  VAT  bases.  This  applies  also  to  countries  with 
high  levels  of  investment,  but  financed  by  capital  imports  (e.g. 
less prosperous countries with high growth). 
Since  experience  shows  that  it  is  likely  to  be  less  prosperous 
countries  or  countries  at  a  low  point  in  conjunctural  terms  that 
will  have a  high  share  of consumption  and  low savings,  it can  be 
said  that  the  VAT  resource  is  unfavourable  for  these  countries. 
The  VAT  resource  is  therefore  regressive  compared  to  the  GNP 
key,  although capping of the base  has helped  mitigate this. 
Chart  7  shows  the  distribution  of  VAT  resource  payments  by 
Member State. The actual distribution of VAT payments by country 
is  distorted compared  to the capped  VAT base  (presented  in  Chart 
6)  by the  impact of the  UK  abatement  (which  is  largely  financed 
from the VAT resource). CHART  6 
-------------- ---- --- ·--------------
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Further  problems  with  the  VAT  resource  relate  to  the  effects  of 
the underground economy.  The VAT base will be  biased  in  favour 
of  countries  with  poor  collection  systems.  Also,  it  could  be 
distorted  by  the  impact  of  inferior  statistical  methods,  such  as 
out-dated statistical surveys, etc. 
3.1.3 GNP  Resource 
The  fourth  resource  is  a  contribution  in  proportion  to  the  GNP 
key.  The  GNP  is  used  rather  than  GOP  because  it  better  reflects 
the prosperity of the country concerned. 
Chart  8  shows  the  distribution  of  GNP  payments  by  country.  As 
can  be  seen  the  actual  payments are  proportional  to  the  GNP  key 
apart  from  the  effects  of  the  small  portion  of  the  UK  abatement 
which  is  imputed to the GNP  resource  for countries with low VAT 
bases. 
The  GNP  resource  can  be  distorted  with  respect  to  relative 
prosperity  due  to the  methods  for taking  into  account  unreported 
economic activity (the  underground economy),  which may be  more 
prevalent  in  some  countries  than  in  others.  Also,  as  is  the  case 
for  the  VAT  resource,  inferior  statistical  methods  may  falsify 
the GNP  figures used to establish the base. 
It  could  be  argued  that  a  better  measure  of  relative 
contributive  capacity  between  countries  is  GNP  in  terms  of 
purchasing  power standard  (PPS).  This  measure  attempts to  scale 
GNP  in  terms of a standard  basket of goods,  rather than  in  money 
terms.  Effectively,  it  excludes  changes  in  exchange  rates  that 
are  not  matched  by  inflation  differentials.  Chart  9  presents  the 
actual  GNP  key  used  for  the  fourth  resource  compared  to  GNP  in 
PPS.  This  chart  shows  that,  if  the  PPS  standard  is  seen  as  a 
better  measure,  then  the  present  GNP  base  is  slightly 
progressive since  the GNP  base  is  generally below the GNP  in  PPS 
for poorer Member States and  above it for richer Member States. CHART  8 
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3.2  Developments since  1988 
The  principal  redistributive  elements  of  the  1988  budgetary 
reform  came  through  the  effects  of  doubling  of  the  structural 
Funds  (which  are  basically  allocative  in  nature),  the 
introduction of the fourth own resource  based  on the  GNP  key, of 
VAT capping  and  of the continuation of the UK  abatement system 
together  with  a  reduction  in  the  share  of  Germany  in  its 
financing.  The  factors  determining  the  question  of  redistri-
bution now have evolved  since  1988. 
The  size  of  the  budget  has  increased  significantly  since  1988. 
As  its  size  has  grown  so  has  its  potential  for  redistribution  on 
a  scale  which  has  macroeconomic  effects  in  countries  that  are 
relatively  small  or  poor.  This  growth  in  the  Community  budget 
is  likely  to  continue  as  the  Community  develops.  It  is 
therefore important to see  that it is  funded  fairly. 
Nevertheless,  account  should  be  made  for  the  fact  that  it  is 
only  now that  the  full  redistributive  impact  of  the  1988  reforms 
are  feeding  through  into the  budget.  The  fourth  resource  in  1992 
will  still  only  make  just  over  20%  of  own  resources  and  the 
structural Funds have yet to arrive at their doubled level. 
3. 3  The evolution of relative  prosperity 
Tables  3  and  4  show  the  evolution  of  relative  prosperity  in  the 
Community since  1980, Table  3  based  on GNP  in  terms  of ecus, 
Table 4  in  terms of purchasing power standard  (PPS). 
Looking  at  Table  3,  the  countries  which  have  improved  their 
positions  substantially  since  1988  are  Spain  and  Portugal,  and, 
to  a  lesser  extent,  Italy,  moving  respectively  from  60  %,  28  % 
and 98 % of the Community average to an expected 74 %, 41  % and 
106 %  in  1992. The  positions of Greece  and  Ireland,  on the other 
hand,  have  improved  only  slightly.  The  relative  positions  of 
Denmark,  Germany  (even  without  the  effects  of  reunification), 
France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK  have  all  fallen  somewhat 
since 1988. - 30 -
Table  4  gives  relative  prosperity  in  terms  of  PPS.  With  the 
exception of Luxembourg,  the  PPS  indicator  shows rich  and  poor 
countries  closer  to  the  EC  average  than  under  the  ecu  indicator. 
Prosperity in  the  Netherlands and  the UK  is  above the Community 
average in terms of PPS,  but below in terms of ecus. TABLE  3 
21/11/1991 
GROSS  NATIONAL  PRODUCT  AT  CURRENT  MARKET  PRICES  PER  HEAD  OF  POPULATION 
(Series  including  West  Germany)  ECU;  EUR12  =  100 
8  DK  WD  GR  E  F  IRL  I  ,L  NL  p  UK  EUR12 
1980  120.7  128.0  134.6  43.5  57.7  125.7  55.2  81.6  153.9  121.2  26.7  96.8  100.0 
1981  112.5  125.6  128.5  45.4  56.4  125.2  58.8  83.5  153.0  114.8  29.0  105.5  100.0 
1982  103.2  126.9  129.4  48.8  56.7  122.9  61.6  85.7  159.6  116.9  Z8.1  104.9  100.0 
1983  100.9  132. z  134.1  45.0  50.6  119.9  60.4  91.3  165.9  116.5  25.8  102.6  100.0 
1984  100.7  134.1  133.4  44.9  53.2  118.6  59.5  94.7  168.1  113.3  Z4.6  100.8  100.0 
1985  101.4  138.3  130.8  42.0  54.0  1Z0.1  59.8  94.0  169.4  110.9  Z5.5  10Z.9  100.0  VJ 
1986  103.7  143.1  136.3  36.1  54.9  1ZZ.1  58.8  96.9  172.9  111.3  27.2  91.5  100.0 
1987  105.2  144.2  138.1  34.2  56.4  119.4  57.1  98.3  168.8  108.7  27.5  90.6  100.0 
1988  102.5  139.2  133.6  35.6  59.7  115.9  55.4  97.7  165.6  104.1  Z8.3  98.8  100.0 
1989  102.2  133.3  130.4  35.9  65.1  114.4  56.6  100.3  169.0  100.9  30.5  98.1  100.0 
1990  103.6  132.7  130.8  35.2  68.0  114.0  58.4  101.2  168.0  101.0  33.0  94.1  100.0 
1991  102.5  129.0  131.2  35.6  70.5  110.7  56.6  102.4  166.9  100.0  37.0  93.8  100.0 
1992  102.3  1Z8.4  130.5  35.6  71.9  109.Z  55.9  103.4  166.2  97.6  40.0  '34 .1  100.0 
1993  102.2  127.9  128.7  35.2  73.4  107.8  55.1  104.5  164.8  96.2  41.8  95.3  100.0 
OS,  1  0  92  112  B7VGNOR 
Cseries  including  a  unified  Germany) 
B  OK  D  EL  r:s  F  IRL  I  L  NL  p  UK  EC 
1991  105,8  133,2  115,0  36,7  721 7  114,2  58,4  105,7  172,7  103,2  38,2  96,8  100 
1992  105,1  131,8  116,1  36,6  73,8  112,1  57,4  106,2  170,2  100,3  41,1  96,7  100 
1993  104,6  130,9  115,8  36,0  75,1  110,4  56,4  107,0  168,9  98,4  42,8  97,6  100 TABLE  4 
------------------
21/11/1991 
GROSS  NATIONAL  PRODUCT  AT  CURRENT  MARKET  PRICES  PER  HEAD  OF  POPULATION 
(series  including  West  Germany)  PPS  EIIR12;  EIJR12  =  100 
-------
8  DK  liD  GR  E  F  IRL  I  L  fiL  p  UK  F.UF12 
·--------------
1980  103.2  105.0  114.0  60.0  73.5  112.0  61. 5  102.6  143.9  110-6  53. '  101.1  100.0 
1981  102.5  104.0  114.3  59.5  72.5  113-1  62.6  103.2  148.2  109.5  53.4  100  4  100.0 
1982  102.9  106.0  112.9  58.8  72.7  114.4  61. 5  102.7  164.9  107.2  53.0  101.8  100.0 
1983  101.8  107.5  113.7  57.1  72.4  112.7  59.3  102.0  168.3  107.0  51. 9  104.3  100  0 
1984  102.0  109.2  115.5  56.6  71.9  111.3  58.9  102.6  169.4  107.3  49.0  101.0  100.0 
1985  100.3  111.3  115.5  56.5  71.9  110.4  58.2  102.7  173.3  107.6  49.3  101.9  100.0 
1986  99.5  112.5  115.1  55.4  72.4  110.0  56.9  102.5  173.7  106.0  50.8  106.1  100.0 
1987  99.4  110.1  114.0  53.8  74.3  109.0  58.4  102.9  166.5  103.6  52  4  107.4  100.0  VJ 
1988  100.1  107.0  113.4  54.1  75.2  108.6  57.2  103.2  168.5  101.7  52  7  108.0  100  0  N 
1989  100.3  104.7  113. 3  53.7  76.5  108.7  58.6  103.0  175.5  102.2  54.0  107.0  100  0 
1990  101.3  104.1  114.3  52.6  77.4  108.7  61.7  102.2  169.5  103.2  55. 5  105.3  100  0 
1991  102.0  105.4  115.8  52.2  78.7  108.9  61.8  102.3  170.6  104.1  56.4  101.8  100.0 
1992  102.4  107.1  114.7  51.8  79.6  109.0  61.5  102.3  171.2  103.0  56.5  102.2  100.0 
1993  102.7  108.8  113.2  51.6  80.4  109.1  61.6  102.6  17 3. 1  102.3  5h .4  10?..9  100.0 
-·----------
DS,  1  0  212  212  87VGNOR 
(series  including a unified Germany) 
B  DK  D  EL  ES  F  IRL  I  L  NL  p  UK  EC 
1991  105,5  109,0  101,7  54,0  81,3  112,6  63,9  105,8  176,5  107,6  58,3  105,2  100  1992  105,4  110' 3  102,3  53,3  82,0  112,2  63,3  105,4  176,8  106,0  58,2  105,2  100  1993  105,5  111,6  102,0  52,9  82,6  112,0  63,2  105,3  177,7  105,0  58,0  105,6  100 ------·------·---······ 
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Ill.  FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE VOLUME AND STRUCTURE OF OWN 
RESOURCES 
The  evolution  of  the  size  of  the  budget  will  be  decided  in  the  context  of 
the  renewal  of  the  Interinstitutional  Agreement.  Nevertheless,  there  are 
various factors at work which can already be  discerned. 
1 .  The size of the budget. 
The  economic  and  political  context  in  which  the  Community  is 
functioning  has  changed  considerably  over the  past few years  and  can 
be  expected  to  change  further.  In  particular,  the  Community  budget 
must  therefore  be  viewed  over  the  next  five  years  in  the  context  of 
the moves towards Economic and  Monetary Union and European Political 
Union. 
On  the  economic  side,  this  means  that  the  existence  of .a  single 
market can  be  assumed, though  no doubt with some imperfections; that 
intra-Community  exchange  rates  will  remain  stable;  and  that  national 
budget  policies  will  be  coordinated.  Nevertheless,  even  with  the 
full  application  of  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  it  can  be  expected 
that  further  economic  responsibilities  in  the  areas  of  allocation, 
cohesion  and  stabilisation  will  be  assigned  to  the  Community  level. 
These  are  likely  to  add  to  pressure  on  the  resource  side  of  the 
Community budget. 
On  the  political  side,  the  Community's  foreign  policy  role  is  being 
reinforced. This is  also likely to have implications for the budget. - 34-
2.  Some illustrations 
As  an  illustration,  the  additional  resources  that  would  accrue  to  the 
Community  under  different  hypotheses  of  the  global  own  resource 
ceiling  in  percentage  of  GNP  as  well  as  the  maximum  potential 
increase  in  actual  expenditure  (i.e.  not  commitment  appropriations) 
allowed for by these ceilings are given below. 
Based  upon  a  2.5%  annual  GNP  growth  (at  1992  prices)  total  own 
resources might increase as  shown in  the following table : 
OWn  Expenditure  Maximum  Maximum  Maximum 
resource  1992  Expenditure  available  Expenditure 
ceiling  1997  margin  growth  93-97 
%  GNP  ECU  bn  ECU  bn  ECU  bn  %  pa 
1.2  63.7  72.7  9.0  2.7 
1. 25  63.7  75.8  12.1  3.5 
1.3  63.7  78.9  15.2  4.4 
1. 35  63.7  82.0  18.3  5.2 
1.4  63.7  85.1  21.4  6.0 
1.5  63.7  91.4  27.7  7.5 
p.m.  GNP  54928  62149 -------------~~~·-~---
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3.  The structure of receipts 
3. 1  Possible effects of the GATT round. 
In  the  present  CAP  framework,  receipts  from  agricultural  levies 
depend  upon  the  international  price  developments  and  exchange 
rates,  and  may thus  vary  considerably  over  a  period.  A  reduced 
level  of  agricultural  protection  as  discussed  in  the  GATT 
context  and  transcription  of  levies  into  tariff  rates,  subject 
to  reductions  similar  to  those  proposed  for  industrial 
commodities,  will  certainly  diminish  the  revenue  from  this 
source.  Elasticities  are  probably  very  low  so  that  no 
compensatory  rise  in  import  volumes  will  take  place,  unless 
Community production falls. 
On  the  other  hand,  import elasticities  may  be  of some  importance 
for  non-agricultural  commodities,  and  any  initial  cut  in  tariffs 
could  therefore  be  partly  compensated  for  by  higher  import 
volumes. 
During  the  present  GATT  round,  the  Community  has  envisaged 
cutting  the  tariffs  by  approximately  30%,  reducing  the  weighted 
average rate  from 5.19% to 3.63%. The cut would take place over 
a  transitional  period  of  five  to  eight  years  and  the  impact  on 
trade  flows  and  growth  patterns  would  thus  be  spread  over  the 
corresponding  period.  Such  a  reduction  would  certainly  have  a 
considerable  impact  upon  the  structure  of own  resources,  raising 
the call  rate  for the GNP-based  resource. 
3.2  Possible effects of CAP reform. 
CAP  reform  is  aimed  at  bringing  oversupply  under  control  by 
reducing the price support scheme for agriculture. 
It  is  still  premature  to  make  precise  estimates  of  the  impact  of 
the  CAP  reform  on  agricultural  levies.  At  present  cereals  trade 
accounts  for  almost  40%  of  total  levies.  As  an  illustration,  a 
reduction  in  cereal  prices  by  35%  and  in  prices  on  livestock 
products by 15% would reduce levies by around 680m ecus. Thus it 
cannot  be  excluded  that  agricultural  levies,  at  present  some 
1.2bn ecus,  might be  more than  halved,  so  increasing the  need  to 
call  upon other resources. 
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IV.  POSSIBLE CHANGES TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF OWN RESOURCES 
In  this  chapter,  possible  changes  to  the  structure  of  the  own  resources 
system  are  examined,  leaving  the  question  of  the  global  ceiling  on  own 
resources  aside  for  the  time  being.  First,  the  question  of  fairness· in  the 
own  resource  system  is  addressed,  particularly  in  the  light  of  the 
Maastricht Protocol on Economic and  Social Cohesion in which the Commission 
and  the  Member  States  declare  their  intention  to  take  greater  account  of 
the  contributive  capacity  of individual  Member  States  in  the  system  of own 
resources,  and  to  examine  means  of  correcting  for  the  less  prosperous 
Member  States  regressive  elements  existing  in  the  present  own  resources 
system.  In  Section  2  corresponding  proposals  are  put  forward.  Then,  in 
Section 3, the possibility of a  new fifth own resource is investigated. 
1 .  The Fairness of the Own Resource System 
As  has  been  shown  in  Section  11.3,  the  present  distribution  of  own 
resource  receipts  into  the  Community  budget  is  out  of  line  with  GNP 
weights,  even  excluding  the  effects  of  traditional  own  resources  and 
of the UK abatement. 
Nevertheless,  the  budget should  be  seen  as  a  whole,  not just from the 
resource  side.  The  following  sections  investigate  the  various 
arguments  for  and  against  the  use  of the  the  budget  as  a  whole  as  a 
vehicle for redistribution. 
When  looking  at  the  fairness  of  the  Community  budget  in  general,  it 
is  necessary  to  be  well  aware  of  the  methodological  difficulties  of 
making  a  fair  judgcmem  of  the  true  distribution  of  costs  and 
benefits  coming  from  Community  membership.  Not  only  are  there  the 
measurement  problems  mentioned  above  (Section  11.3)  in  the  case  of 
budgetary  own  resources,  but,  on  the  expenditure  side  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  many  of  the  benefits  coming  from  Community  policies 
are  in  the  form  of  resources  transfers  not  directly  linked  to 
expenditure  (due  to  tariffs,  rules  and  regulations  for  example  having 
a  differential  regional  impact).  Also  there  are  large  non-budgetary 
benefits  coming  from  policies  such  as  trade  liberalization,  which 
should  also  be  taken into account since they may benefit some Member 
States more than others. - 37 -
1 . 1  Past Views 
Views  on  the  distributive  role  of  the  Community  budget  differ. 
The  MacDougall  Report  of  April  1977  set  out  a  series  of 
considerations  that  argue,  prima  facie,  in  favour  of  an  emphasis 
on  redistribution  between  Member  States  of  the  Community, 
namely: 
the explicit political objective of economic convergence; 
the  desire  to  avoid  excessive  general  migration  from  poor 
areas; 
the  desire  to  avoid  excessive  migration  of  more  mobile, 
highly trained  manpower; 
the  danger  that,  as  economic  integration  proceeds,  there 
will  be  increasing  pressure  for  real  wage  equality  in  spite 
of productivity differences; 
the  creation  of  a  degree  of  convergence  in  productivity 
levels,  and  automatic  compensation  for  short-term  relative 
changes in  income. 
The MacDougall Group saw the Community concerned more to help 
economically weaker member states with acute economic problems 
{unemployment,  trade,  exchange  rate  and  budget)  than to equalize 
longer-run  differences  in  living  standards.  The  Group  therefore 
came  to  the  tentative  conclusion  that  a  large  part  of  payments 
made  to  Member  States  is  likely  to  be  conditional.  The 
MacDougall  Group  did  see  a  possible  place  for  some  limited 
unconditional  redistribution  through,  for  example,  a  typical 
federal equalization  mechanism. 
The  Padoa-Schioppa  Report of April  1987, however took the  view 
that  "Since  the  Community  is  a  political  entity  whose  content  is 
principally  of  an  economic  nature,  it  is  inevitable  for  it  to  be 
concerned  with  the  broad  balance  of economic  advantages  that it 
offers  to  its  Member  States"  {Sec.  13.1,  p.  115).  It  made  the 
point  that  "budgetary  reforms  should,  inter  alia,  be  designed  to 
ensure  to  the  highest  possible  degree  an  automatically  equitable 
Community  budget"  {Sec.  13.6,  p.  136)  Also,  "Progressivity  on 
the revenue  side  of the Community budget would alleviate  in  some 
degree  the  need  for  the  expenditure  functions  of  the  budget  to 
mix  allocative  and  distributive  characteristics."  {Sec.  13.6,  p. 
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1.2  To  what  extent  should  the  Community  budget  have  a 
redistributive function? 
The  1988  budgetary  reforms  {see  Chapter  II)  implicitly 
acknowledged  that  the  Community  budget  should  have 
redistributive  effects.  The  doubling  of  the  structural  Furids  was 
its  main  redistributive  element.  However,  the  structural  Funds, 
although  their  goal  is  redistributive,  are  channelled  through 
the  allocative  mechanism  of  the  budget,  which  is  the  most 
efficient  in  promoting  the  desired  economic  convergence.  The 
introduction of the fourth own resource based on GNP  and the VAT 
capping  was  not  intended  as  an  instrument  for  progressive 
redistribution  of  the  own  resource  burden,  but  in  order  to 
better  take  into  account  the  contributive  capacity  of  Member 
States  by  moving  towards  a  proportional  system  which  would 
remove  some  of  the  unfairness  of  the  existing  own  resource 
system.  Similarly,  the  UK  abatement  is  clearly  designed  to 
correct  evident  unfairness,  rather  than  as  a  positive  mechanism 
of  redistribution.  The  1988  reforms  thus  implicitly  recognized 
redistribution only in  these restricted senses. 
Whereas,  mature  federations  do  tend  to  have  strongly 
redistributive  central  budgets,  the  Community,  even  in  view  of 
EMU,  has  not  moved  to  comparable  levels  of  institutional  and 
political  centralization  and  of  solidarity  between  individuals. 
It  would  therefore  be  wrong  to  use  such  examples  as  arguments 
for adapting the Community budget along similar lines. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Community  budget  is  getting  larger  and 
the  need  for  economic  and  social  cohesion  is  more  apparent  as 
the  Community  advances.  This  need  was  explicitly  recognized  in 
the Maastricht Protocol on  Economic and  Social Cohesion. 
It  is  through  the  allocative  function  of  Community  policies  that 
the  main  redistributive  effects  of  the  budget  should  take  place. 
This  implies  that  any  redistributive  efforts  should  be 
concentrated  on  the  expenditure  side  of the  budget.  In  this  way 
the  Community  can  directly  contribute  to  the  efforts  of  Member 
States  to  improve  their  economic  position.  Many  Community 
policies  are  geared  to  economic  and  social  cohesion,  e.g.  the 
structural  Funds,  and  these  give  the  Community  finances  a  large 
measure  of  equity.  Chart  1  0  shows  the  contribution  in  terms  of 
resource transfer that  the structural  Funds  have made to member 
countries'  GNP  since  1988. The  new Cohesion  Fund  will  reinforce 
these  efforts.  The  redistributional  aspect  of  this  expenditure 
is  not in  doubt. CHART  10 
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(in%  of  GNP,  1987-1992) 
%  of  GNP 
3,5 ~ 
I, 
3 
2,5 
2 
1 ,5 
0,5 
0 
~d  wa ,IH ~?:J,IIhl ra ,•H f§l,IJ-d  W!l,IJ-.JI§:l, ~  wa,IH  l'?:l ,IH w, Rf--.? 
8  DK  D  GR  E  F  IRL  L  NL  p  UK  EC 
c=J  Av.  87-89  ~  1990  CJ 1991  ..  1992 
VI 
>{) - 40-
On  the  resource  side,  the  UK  abatement  and  the  reduction  in  the 
German  share  of  its  financing  are  already  examples  of  adjusting 
the  resource  side  of  the  Community  budget  for  reasons  of 
redistribution.  They  are  designed  to  correct  existing  budgetary 
imbalances, rather than to bring about ex ante redistribution. 
2.  Proposed changes to the own resource system 
The  main  problem  of unfairness  in  the  budget  is  the  regressive  nature 
of  the  VAT  resource.  This  concerns  the  tendency  for  the  less 
prosperous  countries  to  pay  more  than  their  fair  share  on  the  VAT 
resource.  Spain,  Greece,  Ireland  and  Portugal  pay  at  the  capped  rate 
of 55% of VAT.  In  particular,  Denmark,  Italy and  Belgium pay less.  As 
noted  above  (Section  II),  this  is  basically  due  to  the  tendency  of 
less  prosperous countries to consume more as  a  proportion of GNP than 
richer countries. 
This  unfairness  was  implicitly  recognized  in  the  Maastricht  Protocol 
on  Economic  and  Social  Cohesion.  In  line  with  the  Protocol,  the 
Commission  therefore  proposes  making  more extensive  use  of the  GNP 
resource  in  order  to  take  greater  account  of  the  contributive 
capacity  of  Member  States.  It  also  proposes  lessening  the  distortions 
of  the  VAT  resource  in  order  to  help  correct  its  regressive 
influence. 
2.1  More extensive use of the GNP  resource 
In  order  to  bring  the  own  resources  system  closer  into  line  with 
the  contributive  capacity  of  the  Member  States,  the  Commission 
proposes  increasing  the  use  of the  GNP  resource  at the  expense 
of  the  VAT  resource.  While  this  effect  is  already  inherent  in 
the  present own  resource  system,  since  the  VAT ceiling  is  1.4% 
and  increases  in  the  budget  relative  to  the  VAT  base  are 
financed  via  the  GNP  resource,  a  fairer  distribution  of  the 
burden  of  resource  payments  could  be  achieved  through  a 
reduction  in  the  VAT  call  rate  by  0.4  percentage  points.  This 
would reduce the VAT ceiling  from  1.4% to 1.0%. 
Such  a  measure  would  reduce  the  annual  receipts  from  the  VAT 
resource  by  approximately  11 bn  ecus.  The  fall  in  VAT  receipts 
would  be  compensated  by  higher  GNP  contributions.  Basically, 
this  would  add  to  the  financial  burden  of  countries  whose  share 
of  Community  GNP  exceeds  their  share  in  the  capped  VAT base. 
Thus  Belgium,  Denmark  and  Italy,  would  see  their  total  own 
resource  contribution  grow,  whereas  it  will  decline  for  other 
Member  States  (see  Chart  11 ).  In  addition,  a  cut  in  the  VAT call 
rate would lead  to a decline in  the UK abatement. -------------------------------
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2.2  Capping the VAT base  at a lower level 
The  Commission  also  proposes  to  further  correct  the  regressive 
distortion  inherent  in  the  VAT  base  by capping  the  VAT  base  at 
50%  of GNP  instead  of the  present  55%.  It should  be  noted  that 
50% is  about the average  share of GNP  of the capped  VAT bases 
for the Community (see  Table  2 above).  A  cap at 50% would link 
the third  resource  to the  GNP  base  for  France,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands  in  addition  to  the  six  Member  States  whose  base  is 
already capped. 
Such  a  cap  at  50%  would  reduce  the  VAT  yield  by  1 .1 bn  ecus, 
which  would  be  offset  by  a  higher  GNP  contribution.  Again  the 
impact  of  such  a  capping  would  be  to  shift  the  financial  burden 
onto those Member States  whose relative  GNP  share  exceeds their 
share  in  the VAT base  capped  at 50  %,  which  are  the same three 
countries  that  are  adversely  affected  by  a  reduction  in  the  VAT 
call  rate,  together  with  the  Netherlands  (see  Chart  12). 
Similarly  to  the  reduction  in  the  VAT  call  rate,  this  measure 
will also bring down the size of the UK  abatement. 20 
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3.  A  new fifth Community own resource? 
In  the  longer  term  it  would  be  preferable  for  the  Community  to  be 
responsible  towards  individual  taxpayers  for  its  resources,  rather 
than  to  rely  on  national  contributions  as  will  be  more  and  more  the 
case  in  the  future.  This  view  is  apparently  supported  by · public 
opinion  since,  according to a  recent  survey  (Eurobarometer,  22-29 May 
1991),  58  %  of  EC  citizens  support  direct  EC  taxation  ( 14  %  did  not 
give  an  opinion).  Such  a  reform  should  be  linked  to  an  increase  in 
the responsibilities of the European Parliament. 
3.1  The  political  perception  of  the  own  resources  in  the  Member 
States. 
There  is  a  clear  difference  between  how  the  two  categories  of 
existing  own  resources  are  perceived  politically  in  the  Member 
States.  The  traditional  own  resources  (customs  duties, 
agricultural  levies  and  sugar  levies)  do  seem  to  be  accepted  as 
genuine  own  resources  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not  seen  as  a 
national  contribution  towards  the  Community  budget.  This  is 
presumably due both to the economic reasoning  behind the choice 
of  these  resources  and  to  the  fact  that  they  are  levied  directly 
on  economic  agents.  Budgetarily,  the  traditional  own  resources 
are  often  treated  differently  from  the  VAT  or  GNP  resources  at 
the national level. 
In  contrast,  the  GNP  own  resource  but  also  the  VAT  resource, 
though  handled  similarly  to  traditional  own  resources  in 
Community law, are generally perceived by governments and, above 
all,  by  national  parliaments  as  mere  budgetary  contributions 
from the Member States. 
3. 2  The need  for true Community own resources 
A  situation  in  which  the  budget  would  be  funded  to  an  even 
greater  extent  by  what  are  perceived  as  national  contributions 
would  be  unsatisfactory  from  the  Community's  point  of  view. 
Politically,  it  would  reduce  the  Community  to  being  financially 
dependent  on  national  governments,  and  therefore  responsible 
financially  towards  them  rather  than  towards  individual  tax-
payers.  The  Community  budget  would  then  tend  to  become 
dependent  on  national  budgetary  prioritie:  rather  than  Community 
considerations.  The  governments  of the  f\1ember  States  are  put in 
the  position  of  being  politically  responsible  towards  their  tax-
payers  for  their  share  of  Community  spending  which  is  not  fully 
under their control. - 45 -
In  the  long  term  this  is  an  unhealthy  situation  which  could  risk 
frustrating  the  development  of  Community  policies.  It  introduces 
an  additional  rigidity  into  the  management  of  the  Community's 
finances.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  institutional  difficulties 
surrounding  the  calls  since  1988  on  additional  resources  which 
have been well below the overall ceiling on own resources  .. 
It  should  be  noted  that  a  possible  new  fifth  Community  own 
resource  is  not  needed  primarily  in  order  to  increase  the  size 
of the Community budget, because the present fourth GNP resource 
provides  the  extra  funds  needed  within  the  own  resource  ceiling. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  size  of the Community  budget  increases,  the 
need for true own resources will become more pressing. 
3.3  Criteria for a possible fifth own resource 
Any  new fifth  own  resource  should  be  judged  by its  fulfilment of 
the following criteria: 
A  new own resource  should  be  fair from the point of view of 
the contributive capacity of the Member States. 
Any  tax  from  which a  new fifth  Community  resource  is  to  be 
drawn  should  have  an  effectively  (not  just  theoretically) 
harmonised  base  and  be  imposed  at  a  uniform  rate.  This 
harmonization,  which  must  be  justified  on  economic  grounds, 
will  ensure  that  the  economic  effect  of  implementing  such  a 
tax  would  not  distort  competition  and  the  functioning  of  the 
internal market. 
A  new own resource should be  linked to a common policy in an 
area  in  which  the  Community  has  a  well-recognized  and 
acknowledged  role.  Not  only  is  this  a  requirement  of  Article 
2.2 of the  Decision on  Own  Resources,  but it  would  help  the 
raising  of  Community  funds  appear  justified  in  the  eyes  of 
the  public  and  policy  makers.  Of course,  this  would  not mean 
that  the  product  of  the  fifth  resource  should  be  imputed  to 
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There  is  little  point  in  creating  a  new  fifth  own  resource 
unless  there  is  the  prospect  that  it  would  reliably  and 
predictably  give  substantial  revenue,  and  not  be  too  costly 
to  levy  (an  existing  tax  may  be  cheaper  than  a  new one,  an 
excise  tax  is  likely  to  be  less  costly  to  administer  than  an 
indirect or direct tax). 
Clear  visibility 
important  for 
that : 
through  direct  links  to  tax  payers  is 
democratic  accountability.  This  implies 
=  coverage  of  the  tax  should  be  broad,  so  as  to  affect  as 
many economic agents as  possible; 
individuals  should also contribute rather than firms only; 
=  the  rate  of  imposition  of  the  tax  should  be  such  that  it 
is  noticed by contributors. 
3.4  The conditions for a fifth own resource 
For  the  institutional  and  the  financial  development  of  the 
Community,  it  would  be  desirable  to  introduce  a  new  fifth  own 
resource.  This  would  go  some  way  to  correct  the  present 
unsatisfactory  situation  in  which  the  traditional  own  resources 
are  diminishing  in  importance.  Moreover,  not  only  the  GNP,  but 
also  the  VAT  resources  are  actually  perceived  by  governments 
and,  above  all,  by  national  parliaments  as  national 
contributions,  rather than true Community own resources. 
It  is  important  that  a  new  own  resource  should  be  fair.  Also  it 
should  be  a  genuine  Community  tax  and  thus  come  from  a 
harmonized  base.  This  harmonization  must  be  justified  on 
economic  grounds.  Moreover,  politically,  a  fifth  resource  should 
be  linked  to  ·  increased  budgetary  responsibilities  for  the 
European Parliament. 
The  Commission  has  examined  various  possibilities  concerning 
taxes  at  the  national  level  whose  proceeds  could  be  shared  with 
the  Community.  However,  it  has  found  that,  at  present,  no 
candidate  exists  in  the  tax  system  of  the  Member  States  with  a 
base that is  sufficiently harmonized. 
In  the  medium-term,  the  political  development  of the  Community 
will make a new own resource necessary. The Commission will make 
every  effort  to  promote  the  necessary  conditions  allowing  the 
creation of such a  resource. 